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I. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case1 
Respondent Elmore County originally hired Appellant Cherri Nix on June 1, 2007. 
(R. Vol. 1, p. 36) Subject to her employment and the Elmore County Personnel Policy (hereinafter 
"ECPP"), she was a probationary employee for one-yearuntilJune 1, 2008. (R. Vol. 1, p. 180) After 
this period, Nix began having issues with her work performance and inaccuracies in her time cards, 
and Elmore County began to warn her of such through verbal and written notices beginning in 
January 2011. (R. Vol. 1, p. 194-200). On February 1, 2012, Nix was provided with a "NOTICE 
OF DISCIPLINARY ACTION-NOTICE OF LAST CHANCE," by her supervisor, Vence Parsons, 
which placed her on a one-year probationary status. (Id.) As conditions of her probation, this notice 
advised Nix, "[y Jou are, and remain, an at-will employee," and also that, "you may be subject to 
immediate termination at any time during the probationary period." (R. Vol. 1, p. 199) Ultimately, 
on April 30, 2012, Nix was terminated by Elmore County for failure to remedy the performance 
deficiencies as outline in the Notice of Last Chance. (R. Vol. 1, p. 68-69) 
Nix made a written request to meet with the Elmore County Board of County 
Commissioners (hereinafter "BOCC") on May 4, 2012. (R. Vol. 1, p. 70) Through further 
correspondence with Nix' s then counsel, Nix asserted she had the right to a pre-termination hearing 
pursuant to the ECPP. (R. Vol. 1, p. 71-72) As Nix was an at-will probationary employee subject 
to immediate termination at any time, she was not entitled to any pre-termination hearing. (R. Vol. 
1 Respondent refers to and incorporates by reference the procedural background in the 
District Court's Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment for additional factual 
and procedural history of this case. (R. Vol. 2, p. 224-225; R. Vol. 3, p. 401-402) 
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1, p. 74) However, Elmore County still noticed a hearing for June 11, 2012 where the BOCC would 
discuss any claims of unlawful discrimination that Nix may have had in connection with her 
termination. (R. Vol. I, p. 73) Elmore County also allowed Nix' s legal counsel the opportunity to 
present to the BOCC "any further legal authority you have in support for your request for an 
evidentiary hearing." (R. Vol. 1, p. 74) 
At the June 11, 2012 hearing with the BOCC, Nix confirmed that she had no claims 
of unlawful discrimination in connection with her termination. (R. Vol. 1, p. 75) Nix was then also 
permitted to argue (through legal counsel) that her due process rights were deprived by her not being 
allowed a pre-termination hearing. (R. Vol. 1, p. 76) In its written decision of June 18, 2012, the 
BOCC ruled: 
At the time of Ms. Nix' s termination, she was a probationary 
employee with the county. A probationary employee of the county is 
expressly an "at-will" employee. The ECPP states that the 
probationary period "shall be utilized for closely observing the 
employee's work ... and for rejecting an introductory employee 
whose performance is not satisfactory. To construe that the ECPP 
creates anything other than "at-will" status for a probationary 
employee, or that the probationary employee is entitled to a hearing 
upon termination, would render the probationary employee concept 
meaningless under the ECPP. Probationary employees are not 
entitled to a hearing under the ECPP. 
(R. Vol. I, p. 76) The BOCC then referenced Romero v. Plummer, CV-2010-113, Idaho Fourth 
Judicial District (April 8, 2011), where that district court held that "[p]robationary and casual 
employees are not entitled to any hearing.'' (R. Vol. 1, p. 76; see also R. Vol. 1, p. 147-156) The 
BOCC upheld Nix's April 30, 2012 termination. (R. Vol. 1, p. 77) 
Nix then filed a civil complaint against Elmore County on December 10, 2012, 
alleging wrongful discharge in violation of the ECPP, wrongful discharge in violation of her "for 
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cause" employment status, and wrongful discharge in violation of the Idaho Protection of Public 
Employees Act. (R. Vol. 1, p. 10-16) Nix specifically alleged that she was not afforded a pre-
deprivation hearing, that she was not an at-will employee and was therefore wrongfully terminated 
without cause, and that she was forced to improperly alter her time cards and terminated because she 
refused to do so. (Id.) 
1. Nix's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
Nix moved for partial summary judgment soon after filing her complaint where she 
argued that she was not afforded any pre-deprivation hearing as allegedly provided by the ECPP, and 
also alleged a violation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in conjunction with 
the County not providing any pre-deprivation hearing. 2 (R. Vol. 1, p. 79-97) The district court 
denied this motion for partial summary judgment, holding that Nix was an at-will employee subject 
to immediate termination and not entitled to a pre-termination hearing, in that she had failed to 
establish that "she had a contract to be employed for a specified time or which limits the reason(s) 
she may be terminated." (R. Vol. 2, p. 227) The District Court also noted that "[t]he existence of 
a grievance procedure in an employee policy manual is insufficient to overcome the presumption of 
employment at-will and create an issue of fact for trial." (R. Vol. 2, p. 228) Therefore,"[ s ]ince there 
was no contract, [Nix] was an at-will employee and [Elmore County] had the ability to end the 
employment relationship at any time without incurring liability." (R. Vol. 2, p. 228) 
Also, the District Court established that Plaintiff failed to show an issue of material 
fact that Elmore County breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. (R. Vol. 2, 
2 The majority of Nix' s argument supporting her motion for partial summary judgment is 
repeated in her appellate briefing here before the Court. (Compare R. Vol. 1, p. 91-96, and 
Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 12-16) 
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p. 229-231) In its analysis, the Court established that while probationary status may not have been 
clearly defined in the ECPP, the Notice of Disciplinary Action did so by stating the express terms 
of Nix's probation, including immediate termination. (R. Vol. 2, p. 231) Through the District 
Court's legal interpretation of the ECPP, Elmore County was not required to provide an appeal 
hearing to Nix, and therefore there was no violation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing. Id. 
2. Elmore County's Motion for Summary Judgment 
Based on the legal determinations made in the District Court's denial of Nix' s Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment that Nix was an at-will employee and not entitled to any pre-
termination hearing, and that there was no violation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing, Elmore County later moved for full summary judgment on those same grounds and 
prevailed. (R. Vol. 2, p. 250-255, 378-388; R. Vol. 3, p. 401-409) The District Court reaffirmed 
its prior denial of Nix's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and the legal findings therein in its 
ruling. (R. Vol. 3, p. 406) Nix did not present any new evidence sufficient to create an issue of 
material fact and to avoid summary judgment. (Id.) The District Court also granted summary 
judgment with respect to Nix' s additional cause of action regarding allegations of a violation of the 
Idaho Protection of Public Employees Act, ("IPPEA"), as being barred by the appropriate statute of 
limitations found in LC. § 6-2105(2). (R. Vol. 3, p. 407) Elmore County later moved for fees and 
costs as the prevailing party, and in light of Nix' s failure to object to the motion, the District Court 
granted fees and costs to Elmore County. (R. Vol. 3, p. 415-420) 
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II. 
ATTORNEYS FEES ON APPEAL 
Elmore County is entitled to an award of its fees and costs on appeal pursuant to 
Idaho Code§§ 12-107, 12-117, 12-120. [ALL HIGHLIGHTED SECTIONS HERENOTINTABLE 
OF AUTHORITIES] Elmore County is a "political subdivision" within the meaning of the statute 
and is therefore entitled to an award of fees and costs if the Court finds it is the prevailing party and 
that Nix, in bringing her appeal, acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. I.C. § 12-117(1 ). 
In addition, "[t]he mandatory attorney fee provisions of I.C. § 12-120 govern on appeal as well as 
in the trial court." Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC v. Nord Excavating & Paving, Inc., 141 Idaho 716, 
721 (2005) (quoting Daisy Mfg. Co. v. Paintball Sports, Inc., 134 Idaho 259, 263 (2000)). 
Nix's Counts I and II related to allegations of wrongful termination and a violation 
of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, both relating to Nix' s employment agreement with 
Elmore County. (R. Vol. 1, p. 10-14) Therefore, attorney's fees under I.C. § 12-120(3) are 
appropriate for Elmore County because these claims both are best classified as "commercial 
transactions." Pursuant to Jenkins v. Boise Cascade Corporation, 141 Idaho 233 (2004), the 
prevailing party in an action based on an alleged breach of the employment contract is entitled to 
attorney's fees according to I.C. § 12-120(3 ). The plaintiff in Jenkins asserted that his termination 
was wrongful in that it was not for cause and he was therefore a contract employee, and that his 
termination violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Id. at 237, 240-243. 
Ultimately, the court held that the plaintiff was, in fact, an at-will employee, and found that his 
termination was proper pursuant to his at-will status, and the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing. Id. Attorney's fees were awarded to the defendant employer as it prevailed in summary 
judgment with respect to these employment claims. Id. at 243-44. The court specifically noted that 
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"the gravamen of this case was a contract action," and therefore the defendant employer was entitled 
to fees associated with defending that action. Id. Accordingly, as the Jenkins court found that 
attorney's fees were applicable in that instance pursuant to I.C. § 12-120(3), there is no factual or 
legal basis for this Court to not follow Jenkins and similarly grant attorney's fees in the current 
instance on appeal. 
III. 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court properly denied Nix's motion for partial summary judgment as 
well as granting Elmore County's motion for full summary judgment. Elmore County respectfully 
requests that the Court affirm the judgment for Elmore County and grant fees and costs pursuant to 
this appeal. 
A. Standard of Review 
When reviewing an appeal of an order granting summary judgment, the standard of 
review is the same as that used by the trial court in ruling on the motion. Summers v. Cambridge 
Joint Sch. Dist. No. 432, 139 Idaho 953, 955 (2004). Summary judgment is proper where "the 
pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there 
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56( c ). When considering a motion for summary judgment, all controverted 
facts are to be liberally construed in favor of the nonmoving party. McCoy v. Lyons, 120 Idaho 765, 
769, 820 P.2d 360, 364 (1991 ). Moreover, the Court must draw all reasonable inferences and 
conclusions in favor of the party resisting the motion. Id. 
The party moving for summary judgment initially bears the burden of establishing 
both the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and that he or she is entitled to judgment as a 
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matter of law. McCoy, 120 Idaho at 769, 820 P.2d at 364. This burden may be met by establishing 
the absence of evidence on an element that the nonmoving party will be required to prove at trial. 
Dunnick v. Elder, 126 Idaho 308,311, 882 P.2d 475,478 (Ct. App. 1994). Such an absence of 
evidence may be established either by an affirmative showing with the moving party's own evidence 
or by a review of all the nonmoving party's evidence and the contention that proof of a particular 
element is lacking. Heath v. Honker's Mini-Mart, Inc., 134 Idaho 711, 712, 8 P.3d 1254, 1255 (Ct. 
App. 2000). 
Once the moving party establishes the absence of a genuine issue of fact, the burden 
shifts to the nonmoving party to produce admissible evidence, which sets forth specific facts 
showing the existence of a genuine issue of fact on the elements challenged by the moving party. 
I.R.C.P. 56(e); Olsen v. J.A. Freeman Co., 117 Idaho 706, 720 21, 791 P.2d 1285, 1299 1300 (1990); 
Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency, Inc., 126 Idaho 527,530 31,887 P.2d 1034, 1037 38 (1994). An 
opposing party may not merely rest on allegations contained in his pleadings nor may the opposing 
party's case rest on speculation or conclusory assertions. Northwest Bee-Corp v. Home Living Serv., 
136 Idaho 835,839, 41 P.3d 263,267 (2002); McCoy, 120 Idaho at 769,820 P.2d at 364. The party 
opposing the motion must produce evidence, by affidavit or otherwise, to show that there is indeed 
a genuine issue for trial. I.R.C.P. 56(e); Olsen, 117 Idaho at 720, 791 P.2d at 1299. 
B. The District Court Did Not Err In Determining that the ECPP Did Not 
Require Nix to Receive a Pre-Termination Hearing Prior to Her 
Discharge Based on Her Probationary Status. 
Nix has asserted that the ECPP requires her to have a pre-termination hearing, but this 
assertion would create a contractual obligation where one does not exist. Nix's main argument is 
that the ECPP required her to receive a pre-termination hearing, and as she did not receive this 
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hearing, her due process rights were violated. 3 (Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 10) She asserts that 
should this pre-termination hearing be required, that Elmore County violated both her due process 
rights or the implied covenant of good faith in fair dealing in not providing her this hearing. 
(Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 10) On appeal, Nix asserts that the District Court's "characterization 
of the probationary status given Nix by her supervisor on February 1, 2012 was error." (Appellant's 
Opening Brief, p. 11) This argument comes from Nix based on two incorrect legal assumptions that 
she makes: 1) that the ECPP was contractual in nature and had the effect of an employment 
agreement between Nix and Elmore County, and 2) that Nix's disciplinary probation status (as 
opposed to an introductory probation status) afforded her a pre-termination hearing. (Appellant's 
Opening Brief, p. 11-16) 
As the District Court held, the disclaimer language in the ECPP leaves no question 
of material fact that there was no intent by the county commissioners to include the ECPP as part 
of her employment agreement orto create enforceable contract rights. (See R. Vol. 1, p. 165; R. Vol. 
2, p. 227-228) Nix had the burden to establish the existence of this contract, and she failed to do so. 
(R. Vol. 2, p. 228) Nix had no contractual rights to any provisions found in the ECPP, and this 
would include any pre-termination appeal offered in the ECPP. In addition, as an at-will employee 
at the time of her termination, there were no limitations on the termination of the employment 
3 Nix has set forth three issues on appeal. Issue # 1 is presented as "Did the covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing require a pre-termination hearing prior to the discharge of Nix as an 
employee of Elmore County?" (Appellant's Opening Brief; p. 10) Issue #3 is presented as, "Did 
an agreement regarding employment terms including the right to a due process pre-termination 
hearing exist regardless of whether or not Nix was an employee at will?" (Id.) As these two 
issues are essentially the same issue and both are responded to with the same legal reasoning, 
Elmore County will address both issues #1 and #3 in this first section, while leaving the 
remaining issue #2 and its distinct legal analysis for the following section. 
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relationship between Nix and Elmore County, and, as such, she was not offered any hearing under 
state law. Also, as a probationary employee at the time of her termination, she was not entitled to 
any pre-termination hearing as the conditions of her probation allowed for immediate termination 
at any time during the probation period and that any "for cause" probationary status is not 
contemplated by the ECPP. Consequently, Nix cannot legally prevail on her appeal and Elmore 
County respectfully requests affirmation of the decision of the lower court. 
1. No Contractual Entitlement to Pre-Termination Hearing 
There is insufficient legal basis for the Court to reasonably infer that there is any 
contractual obligation that leaves Elmore County liable to Nix for not providing her, as an at-will 
employee, an appeal hearing prior to her termination. The ECPP is not a contract. (R. Vol. 1, p. 
165) Due to the lack of any employment contract to the contrary, Nix was undeniably an at-will 
employee at the time of her termination, and as such had no contractually created property interest 
in continuing employment. This would preclude any property interest in any pre-termination 
hearing. Idaho law establishes that where there is a clear contractual disclaimer in a personnel 
policy, there is no question of material fact in the lack of intent by the employer for that personnel 
policy to be considered as part of the employment agreement. Mitchell v. Zilog, 125 Idaho 709, 712-
13, 874 P.2d 520, 523-24 (1994). Thus, due to the clear contractual disclaimer in the ECPP at issue 
here, there can be no issue of material fact that there was no intent by Elmore County to include the 
policy or its provisions as a part of Nix' s employment agreement. Without any contractual provision 
to rely upon, there is no entitlement to any termination procedure sufficient to maintain a wrongful 
termination action. 
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"Under the federal constitution, at-will employees possess no protected property 
rights and therefore are not entitled to due process before being terminated." Lawson v. Umatilla 
County, 139 F.3d 690, 691-92 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Portman v. County of Santa Clara, 995 F.2d 
898, 904 (9th Cir.1993)). In Idaho, employment is at-will unless an employee is hired pursuant to 
a contract that specifies the duration of employment or limits the reasons for which an employee may 
be terminated. See Jenkins v. Boise Cascade Corp., 108 P.3d 380, 387 (Idaho 2005). Without a 
contractual agreement limiting a party's right to terminate the employment relationship, "either party 
may terminate it at any time or for any reason without incurring liability." Mitchell v. Zilog, Inc., 125 
Idaho 709, 713, 874 P.2d 520, 523 (1994) (emphasis added). This presumption of at-will 
employment may be rebutted if the parties intend that an employee handbook or manual will 
constitute an element of an employment contract, but at-will status is retained when the employee 
manual contains a superceding disclaimer that "specifically negates any intention on the part of the 
employer to have [the handbook or manual] become a part of the employment contract." Zilog, 125 
Idaho at 712-13, 874 P.2d at 523-24 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted); see also Metca(l 
v. lntermountain Gas Co., 116 Idaho 622, 624-25, 778 P.2d 744, 746-47 (1989) (discussing 
presumption of at-will employment). The valid disclaimer in Zilog read, in part, as follows: 
This guide is not to be construed as a contract between Zilog and its 
employees and does not in any way imply or create any rights, 
contractual or otherwise, on behalf of Zilog's employees. Zilog may, 
at its sole discretion, alter or amend this guide or portions thereof at 
any time. 
Zilog, 125 Idaho at 713, 874 P.2d at 524. Thus, pursuant to well-established Idaho law, when an 
employment manual or personnel policy specifically negates any intention to become part of the 
employment contract, there is no question of fact that the presumption of at-will employment 
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relationship remains regardless of the language within that personnel policy. When an employee is 
at-will, there are no limitations on the termination of the employment relationship, and there cannot 
be any inferred contractual protections creating "for-cause" status from any document, as the very 
nature of being "at-will" indicates that there is no express or implied contractual limitation on the 
termination of the employment relationship. 
This Court has recently addressed this issue and made clear that where, as here, the 
alleged source of a limitation on the at-will employment relationship is the employer's policies, the 
"policies must manifest an intent that they become part of the employment agreement." Bollinger 
v. Fall River Rural Elec. Co-op., Inc., 152 Idaho 632, 639, 272 P.3d 1263, 1269 (2012) (citing 
Metcalf, 116 Idaho at 624 ). Prior holdings from this Court explain the reasoning for this established 
law: 
[A]n employer may provide guidelines, which are necessary 
conditions for continued employment, and avoid having them read as 
a guarantee for a specific term of employment or placing limits on the 
reasons for discharge. 
An employer's custom of only terminating employees for good cause 
is likewise not sufficient to support a claim of an implied contract 
term eliminating the employer's right to terminate at will. As the 
Court of Appeals in Atwood [v. Western Const., Inc., 129 Idaho 234, 
239, 923 P.2d 479,484 (Ct. App. 1996)] reasoned: 
As a matter of policy, this Court will not consider evidence 
that a company does not usually fire employees without a 
good reason as by itself establishing that the company does 
not maintain an at-will employment policy. To do otherwise 
would encourage employers to occasionally fire employees 
for no other reason than to show that they maintain the 
freedom to do so. 
If we were to accept the . . . contention that an employer who 
normally only fires employees for good cause should be held to have 
forfeited the ability to claim an at-will relationship with employees, 
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the rule would necessarily swallow up the at-will presumption. 
Employers would be forced to arbitrarily fire an employee 
periodically just to reaffirm their right to discharge for no reason. 
Jenkins v. Boise Cascade Corp., 141 Idaho 233, 242, 108 P.3d 380, 389 (2005) (internal citations 
omitted) (bracketed language added) (emphasis added). Here, due to the contractual disclaimer 
found in the ECPP, any provisions found in the ECPP itself are simply guidelines, but do not place 
limits on the reasons or procedure for discharge, regardless of the language used. 
In Lawson v. Umatilla County, 139 F.3d 690, 691 (9th Cir. 1998), the Ninth Circuit 
considered a similar factual situation as applied to Oregon case law that mirrors applicable Idaho 
law. There, a county employee alleged that his permanent classification status and the county 
personnel policy afforded him protections such that he was no longer an at-will employee, and 
created a protected property interest in his continuing employment. Id. at 691. However, the 
Personnel Policies there also included a disclaimer that the personnel policies were not an 
employment contract with the employee. Lawson v. Umatilla County, 139 F.3d 690,691 (9th Cir. 
1998). Consequently, the court there held that the disclaimer would "retain the employee's at-will 
status even when the policies also provide specific reasons for termination and for an appeals 
process." Id. at 693 (emphasis added). 
The personnel policy at issue in this case is not a contract. (R. Vol. 1, p. 165) Thus, 
it cannot rebut the presumption of at-will employment. The disclaimer language found in the ECPP 
is similar to the language upheld by the Idaho Supreme Court as a valid disclaimer of any limitation 
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on the at-will employment relationship in Zilog, supra, and Parker v. Boise Telco Federal Credit 
Union, 129 Idaho 248, 250-51 (Ct. App. 1996).4 The ECPP reads: 
THIS PERSONNEL POLICY IS NOT A CONTRACT. NO 
CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT WITH ELMORE COUNTY 
WILL BEV ALID UNLESS IT IS SIGNED IN ACCORDANCE 
WITH PROPER PROCEDURES BY A SPECIFICALLY 
AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE OF THE GOVERNING 
BOARD AND UNLESS IT IS SIGNED AND CONTAINS THE 
NAME OF THE EMPLOYEE WHO WOULD BE 
BENEFITTED BY THE CONTRACT. 
(R. Vol. 1, p. 165) (emphasis in original) This language validly disclaims any possible intent by 
Elmore County to have the policy become part of the employment contract with Nix, and thus 
pursuant to Zilog, supra, there is no question of fact that the ECPP does not negate the existing 
presumption from Idaho law that Nix was an at-will employee. This superceding disclaimer 
precludes any language in the ECPP that could seem to create any contractual limitation on Nix' s 
employment relationship. See Lawson, 139 F.3d at 693; Zilog, supra. 
4The disclaimer in Parker reads as follows: 
The contents contained in this handbook are presented as a matter 
of information only and are not to be construed as a contract 
between the employer and its employees. The [Boise Telco Federal 
Credit Union] reserves the right to unilaterally and without notice 
add to, change or delete, supplement, or rescind all or any part of 
the practices, procedures, or benefits described in the handbook as 
it deems circumstances require. I agree to conform to the rules and 
regulations of the Credit Union. I also understand that my 
employment and compensation can be terminated, with or without 
cause, and with or without notice at any time, at the option of 
either the Credit Union or myself. 
Parker v. Boise Telco Federal Credit Union, 129 Idaho 248, 250-51 (Ct. App. 1996). 
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Additionally, the broad scope of the disclaimer language in the ECPP is supported 
by the language of the disclaimer itself. That language states that the only way for an employee to 
avoid the contractual disclaimer is through a separate contract which requires the name of the 
employee and the signature of both a specifically authorized representative of Elmore County and 
the employee herself. (R. Vol. 1, p. 165) A solitary statement within the ECPP, regardless of the 
language used, does not meet this requirement to elevate its status to a contractual provision to avoid 
the superceding disclaimer. Therefore, the only way the presumption of Nix' s at-will employment 
status can be rebutted is if she can show an actual contract of employment with Elmore County, 
signed in accordance with proper procedures by a specifically authorized representative of the 
governing board, and signed by Nix herself, which indicates an intent of the parties to include the 
ECPP as part of that employment contract. Similarly, without such a contract indicating an intent 
to contractually provide an appeals hearing specifically to Nix, she has no valid claim of a violation 
of a contractual right that does not exist. As there is no evidence that such a contract exists, the 
presumption of at-will employment remains with no limitations on the employment relationship, and 
there also is no contractually provided right in continued employment. 
Nix argues that whether she was a permanent contract employee or an employee at 
will is immaterial, but this simply ignores the definition of being an employee "at-will." There are 
no limitations on the termination of the at-will employment relationship. There is no Idaho case law 
that supports any limitation on termination for an at-will employee. Thus, by simple logic, if Nix 
was, in fact, an at-will employee, there were no limitations on either Elmore County's or Nix' s right 
to terminate the employment relationship, which would negate any implied opportunity to receive 
a pre-termination hearing. 
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Nix also seemingly asserts that she had a continuing property interest m her 
employment based on her reliance on McGraw v. City of Huntington Beach, 882 F.2d 384 (9th Cir. 
1989). (Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 15-16) This undefined, general assertion of a vague property 
interest is an inappropriate attempt to create an issue of material fact and is insufficient to withstand 
summary judgment. See Van v. Portneuf Med. Ctr., 147 Idaho 552,556 (2009). As an employee 
must have more than a "mere hope of continued employment" in order to have a property interest 
in employment in Idaho, it would follow that Nix must have more than a mere conclusory statement 
as basis for some property right's existence. See Harkness v. City of Burley, 1 IO Idaho 353, 356 
( 1986). The only basis for any and all of Nix' s alleged due process claims stems directly from the 
ECPP, and specifically, its mention of an appeal hearing to full-time regular employees. If this 
property interest does not come from the ECPP, it must come from "ordinance, or by implied 
contract." See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344 (1976). There is no evidence of either in this 
case, and there is no factual basis in the record for Nix' s property interest. 
McGraw is also factually distinguishable from Nix' s claims. There, the plaintiff was 
never placed on any probation that included any conditions such as immediate termination, like Nix 
clearly was. Instead, she was promoted to a new position, which she accepted but later wished to 
go back to her prior position. Instead, her employer terminated her in the "promotional probationary 
period," while the Ninth Circuit stated that she had a "constitutionally protected property interest" 
in continued employment at her prior position. Nix had no similar expectation in her continued 
employment because she was specifically placed on probation and informed that she would be 
subject to immediate termination pursuant to that probation. She was not on a "promotional 
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probationary period," but rather was placed on disciplinary probation for poor work performance, 
and had no continued expectation in her employment. 
Nix also incorrectly assumes that she is provided automatic procedural due process 
protections as a public at-will employee, ignoring that any such inherent procedural due process 
protections only arise when there is an already existing protected property interest in continued 
employment based on contract or statute.5 Under the federal constitution, this creates a 
constitutionally protected property interest in continued employment in that a permanent employee's 
employment is not terminable at the will of either the employee or the employer. (See Board of 
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). In other words, when an employee is "for cause." There is 
no such basis in Idaho law that creates a "for-cause" presumption of employment for the majority 
of public employees, such as Nix. While there are examples of public employees in other 
circumstances who are statutorily "for-cause," Nix here does not have such a status. 
For example, in Boudreau v. City of Wendell, 147 Idaho 609,612 (2009), the issue 
addressed by this Court was whether a statutorily "appointed officer" of a city could use the 
provisions of a personnel policy to preempt his at-will employment status as established for his 
"appointed officer" position in J.C. § 50-204. However, this case stands for the presumption that 
local governments can not override statutes as enacted by the legislature. Id. Thus, Boudreau was 
actually a "for-cause" employee based on his statutory "appointed officer" position, and the local 
5In the context of Nix's filed Complaint and her current briefing, Elmore County only 
understands Nix's claims to be contractual and based in Idaho state law. Nix's reliance on 
federal law or constitutional property interest principles without some connection to similar state 
law is misplaced in that it is largely applicable only where there is a constitutionally protected 
property interest in continued employment. As Nix has raised no constitutional claims at any 
time, such reliance on this federal law is unpersuasive. 
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government could not override that statutory position through the provisions of their personnel 
policy. Nix here was not an "appointed officer" under Idaho statute, nor does her claim involve any 
applicable state statute, and thus any public employee "for cause" analysis as applied in Boudreau 
would not be applicable here. In fact, previously cited Idaho case law indicates that Nix is presumed 
to be an at-will employee unless she can provide an employment contract that states otherwise. As 
the personnel policy at issue here is specifically disclaimed as a contract, it cannot be considered as 
such for purposes of Nix' s employment. 
2. Nix's Probationary Status Did Not Entitle Her to a Pre-
Termination Hearing. 
Nix also had no entitlement to a pre-termination hearing due to her probationary 
status and the conditions imposed in that probation. It is undisputed that Nix was a probationary 
employee at the time of her termination. She had been placed on a one-year probation on February 
1, 2012, for poor work performance, and informed at that time in her "Notice of Discipline-Last 
Chance" that she "was, and remain, an at-will employee," and that she could be terminated 
immediately at any time during the one-year probationary period. (R. Vol. 1, p. 199) Nix was 
terminated on April 30, 2012, during the one-year probationary period, for failure to meet the 
working requirements established with respect to the Notice of Last Chance. (R. Vol. 1, p. 68-69) 
In their June 18, 2012, written decision on termination, the BOCC established: 
A probationary employee of the county is expressly an "at-will" 
employee. The ECPP ( employment manual) states that the 
probationary period "shall be utilized for closely observing the 
employee's work ... and for rejecting an introductory employee 
whose performance is not satisfactory." To construe that the ECPP 
creates anything other than "at-will" status for a probationary 
employee, or that the probationary employee is entitled to a hearing 
upon termination, would render the probationary employee concept 
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meaningless under the ECPP. Probationary employees are not 
entitled to a hearing under the ECPP. 
(R. Vol. I, p. 76) The Board continued to explain that in Romero v. Plummer, CV-2010-113, Idaho 
Fourth Judicial District (April 8, 2011),6 the court there stated that the ECPP makes it clear that all 
Elmore County employees are at-will, and probationary employees specifically are not entitled to 
any hearing. The decision in Romero court made no distinction between introductory probation or 
disciplinary probation. Thus, the decision of the BOCC at that time was to deny Nix any pre-
termination hearing because, as a probationary employee, she had no such opportunity. 
Ultimately, Nix attempts to argue a distinction between a "new probation employee" 
and a "disciplinary probation employee," and to then attach "at-will" employment status to the "new 
probation employee" and to create a "for cause" status to the "disciplinary probation employee." 
(Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 12-16) While probationary employees are discussed in two different 
sections of the Personnel Manual, there is no language that would support Nix's inference that there 
is such a difference in "at-will" status between the two. In fact, in the section of the ECPP entitled, 
"Levels of Disciplinary Actions Available," probation is simply listed as one of five disciplinary 
steps which may be taken in response to personnel policy violations, with no further explanation 
provided. (R. Vol. 1, p. 191) Nix argues that "no language is found in the section of the ECPP 
entitled 'Levels of Disciplinary Actions Available' which states that an employee placed on 
disciplinary status of probation is thereby converted into an employee at-will or for that matter, is 
a new or 'introductory' employee." (Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 15) This is because there is no 
language explaining the levels of disciplinary actions available at all. Thus, by Nix' sown admission, 
6 See R. Vol. 1, p. 147-156. 
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the language in the ECPP is, at best, inconclusive as to what the intent of "disciplinary probation" 
might be, but surely this evidences an absence of any intent to create the dual probationary structure 
that Nix asserts she is entitled to. 
However, Nix' s attempt at distinguishing these two types of probation is irrelevant 
because Nix' s notice of her one-year disciplinary probation clearly states that part of the conditions 
of her probation were that Nix was, and would remain, an at-will employee, and could be 
immediately terminated at any time during the one-year probationary period. (R. Vol. 1, p. 199) 
Therefore, it was clarified in her Notice of Last Chance and probation that she was an at-will 
employee subject to immediate termination at any time. Thus, any argument that Nix was under the 
impression that she was a "for-cause" employee while she was on her probationary one-year period 
ignores the existing presumption of at-will status and the clear language of her probationary 
conditions, which were provided to her more than two months before her termination. As her 
probation clearly classified Nix as an at-will employee who could be immediately terminated at any 
time, it is clear that she would not be offered any pre-termination appeal hearing. 
Defendant's Personnel Policy sets forth pro-employee conditions of employment that 
generally encourage positive employee relations. The disclaimers and statements in the ECPP 
indicate that it is intended to be a general statement of policy, not a contract. Idaho precedent, along 
with this Court's own prior holding, is clear: a policy must indicate an intent that it become part of 
the employment agreement to have contractual force and to overcome the presumption of at-will 
employment. Where, as here, there is contract disclaimer language specifically negating such intent, 
the at-will presumption stands. 
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C. The District Court Did Not Err In Determining that Elmore County 
Followed Proper Procedure in Placing Nix on Probation with Specific 
Terms of Immediate Termination. 
The District Court held as a matter of law that the ECPP was not "intended to create 
enforceable contract rights," and that there was no material issue of fact the ECPP did not constitute 
an employment contract for Nix. (R. Vol. 2, p. 228) Again, Nix has provided no evidence that 
would overturn that holding. Nix argues that her supervisor's actions in terminating her were some 
sort of alleged unauthorized change, modification, or interpretation of the ECPP. This is a moot 
point, because there is no preliminary contractual basis for the ECPP to have such authority. The 
final analysis, which remains unrebutted by Nix's evidence in the record, is that she was an at-will 
employee without any other employment contract, and Elmore County could terminate the 
employment relationship at any time pursuant to her disciplinary probation. However, even 
assuming that the provisions of the ECPP created some implied covenant with Nix, every 
disciplinary action taken by her supervisor was not only authorized by the ECPP, but his actions 
were further confirmed by the BOCC, who Nix concedes is the ultimate authority behind the ECPP. 
Even though the ECPP is clearly without contractual authority, the District Court did 
note in its decision that the provisions of the ECPP needed to be followed in good faith to satisfy the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. (R. Vol. 2, p.229 -231) This covenant, which exists 
in both for-cause and at-will employment relationships, only applies to benefits or rights found under 
an employment contract. Idaho does require that both parties in an employment agreement perform, 
in good faith, the obligations required by their agreement. Jenkins v. Boise Cascade Corp., 141 
Idaho 233, 242, 108 P.3d 380, 389 (2005). While there is an implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing with at-will employees, this does not create a duty for the employer to demonstrate cause for 
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a termination. Metcalf v. Intermountain Gas Co., 116 Idaho 622, 627, 778 P.2d 744, 749 (1989). 
"The covenant does not protect the employee from a 'no cause' termination because tenure was never 
a benefit inherent in the at-will agreement." Id. (citation omitted). However, there is protection 
against an employer who simply terminates an employee in order to avoid payment to that employee 
of benefits already earned, such as sales commissions. Id. 
As established here, the ECPP is not part of Nix' s employment agreement because 
it is specifically disclaimed as not part of any employment contract; thus, it cannot create explicit 
contractual requirements under the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. However, the 
District Court still held that Elmore County complied with the provisions of the ECPP, and therefore 
satisfied the covenant, through finding that Nix' s supervisor "followed the policy requiring notice 
prior to discipline which could, and did, include placing her on probationary status as set out on page 
33 of Exhibit A to the Steele Affidavit [R. Vol. 1, p. 191]." (R. Vol. 2, p. 231) A plain reading of 
the ECPP states clearly that a supervisor has specific authority to impose discipline upon employees, 
including placing employees on probationary status or even terminating their employment. (R. Vol. 
1, p. 190-191) The ECPP also permits a supervisor to take any of the prescribed disciplinary actions 
in any order that they deem necessary. (R. Vol. 1, p. 190-191) The BOCC specifically reviewed and 
confirmed all disciplinary actions leading up to Plaintiff's termination, including actions of her 
supervisor, Mr. Parsons. (R. Vol. 1, p. 75-77) 
Nix' s termination was proper because the ECPP permits a supervisor to place an 
employee on probationary status, and to maintain her at-will status, and further because the BOCC 
confirmed both Plaintiffs probationary status prior to her termination, and the termination itself. 
Nix has never produced evidence to rebut the District Court's prior holding that Nix has failed to 
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show an issue of material fact exists that Elmore County breached this covenant. Thus, Mr. Parsons 
followed the policy as written which allowed both placing Plaintiff on probationary status and 
ultimately terminating her employment. These actions were subsequently confirmed by the BOCC. 
D. To the Extent That Other Claims Have Not Been Raised by Nix, They 
Have Been Waived forAppeal. 
Nix has failed to raise any other issues regarding the District Court's decisions, 
including dismissing Nix's Third Cause of Action and the award of attorneys' fees and costs to 
Elmore County. Nix has therefore waived these claims for appeal. See State v. Raudebaugh, 864 
P.2d 596, 601 (1993). However, should the Court believe she has raised them in some fashion, 
Elmore County requests leave to further brief these issues at a later date. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, this Court should affirm the District Court's decision 
in total. Appellant has failed to set forth any meritorious argument as to why the District Court's 
decision was in error or should be reversed. Further, this Court should award the Defendant-
Respondent its attorney fees and costs on appeal under Idaho Code § 12-117 where the Appellant's 
arguments have no valid basis in law or fact. 
DATED this 23rd day of July, 2014. 
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